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ABSTRACT: The introduction of a strong market-oriented economic policy after the 1973 golpe in Chile 
led to economic reforms during the 1980s, characterised by deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation of 
several economic sectors. The reform of the water sector took place as part of this trend. Its overall objective was 
to increase water-use efficiency, implementing a private management model based on the development of water 
markets. 
The model represents the most profound reform that has ever been carried out worldwide in this sector, 
due to its radical neo-liberal conception and to its duration (in force since 1981). Many studies have been carried 
out focusing mainly on the efficiency impact of the reform but no one on its distributive effects. This paper aims 
to fill this gap. The case study (Limarí Province, IV Region) examines the distributive impacts on the relevant 
population (in particular on the poor and the most vulnerable groups, like peasants) through the analysis of all 
water use rights transactions which have taken place in the area from 1981 to 1997, and the determinants of 
peasants’ participation in water market, using survey data from a significant sample (2.4%) of peasant 
households in the area. 
The study shows that the distribution of water rights has worsened since 1981. Namely, peasants’ share of 
water rights decreased significantly as time went on, both in aggregate and per capita terms, undermining their 
agricultural production potential and leading to a deterioration of their standards of living. Moreover, the share in 
water rights by the agricultural sector as a whole decreased, while that by non-agricultural sectors increased. 
The study shows also that peasants access water resources primarily through the claim of original rights 
and enter only marginally the water market, usually as sellers, showing a weak bargaining power. Their 
behaviour in the water market is determined by well identified social, economic and institutional variables, such 
as the age of the head of household, the educational level of the family, the participation in agricultural 
organisations, the managerial positions in water users’ associations, the access to information in local water 
market, the access to credit and the crop mix. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Market-oriented economic policies, set up in Chile after the 1973 golpe, became most 
evident at the beginning of the 1980s, through a series of structural reforms, characterised by 
trade liberalisation, privatisation of public enterprises, deregulation of several markets and 
decentralisation of various economic sectors (Scott, 1996). The water market reform1 took 
place within this setting, aiming at increasing water-use efficiency through the creation of a 
private water market. 
This model is particularly interesting, since it represents the deepest reform ever carried 
out in this sector, due to its radical neo-liberal conception and duration (it has been in force 
since 1981). Many studies have been carried out analysing the efficiency performances of the 
                                                 
‡ Department of Agricultural and Land Economics, University of Florence, Italy. 
† Instituto Nacional de Desarollo Agropecuario, Santiago de Chile. 
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water users organisations, etc. 
 1
private management model (Hearne and Easter, 1995 and 1997; Ríos and Quiroz, 1995; 
Thobani, 1995; Bauer, 1997), but no one has focused on the distributive impact of the water 
reform. The present study aims to fill this gap, analysing the case of Limarí Province, in the 
IV Region of Chile. The case study examines: (i) the distributive impact of the water market 
on the involved population (with emphasis on the poorest sectors and on those whose 
subsistence is mainly dependent on access to water, such as the case of peasants), through the 
analysis of all water rights registrations and market transactions which have taken place in the 
area from 1981 to 1997, and (ii) the determinants of peasants’ participation in the water 
market, using original data from a survey carried out in the area in 1998. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief review of literature on 
private water markets; section 3 submits the analysis of the distributive impacts of the reform, 
both at intra- and inter-sectoral levels; section 4 presents the analysis of the determinants 
affecting peasants’ participation in the water market; and section 5 summarizes the main 
findings of the study. 
2. THE WATER MARKET IN CHILE 
According to the 1981 reform, water is a public good, whose exploitation is left to 
private economic agents through a system of transferable water rights2. To comply with this, 
private ownership and perfect divisibility of water-use rights have been established, water 
registers created within the “Conservadores de Bienes Raices”, and a legal framework 
(procedures, etc.) for the judicial system has been set up. 
As a result, water resources allocation is left to the interplay of demand and supply. The 
state guarantees the functioning of the system by simply establishing the ‘rules of the game’ 
with which all parties must comply (Ríos and Quiroz, 1995; Bauer, 1997). 
2.1. Efficiency effects  
According to Hearne and Easter (1997), private water markets are more efficient than 
public provision of water since they provide incentives for: 
• concentrating resources in higher-value uses; 
• a more rational use and conservation of resources; 
• public budget savings, since private economic agents will directly make at least 
part of the required investments. 
The most positive assessments of the Chilean experience are the ones by Gazmuri 
(1994), who argues that the water market has led to a more efficient water allocation, and by 
Holden and Thobani (1995), who argue that the Chilean experience has proven that private 
markets are more efficient than public provision whenever water resources are scarce, 
infrastructures satisfactory (or conditions for their development exist), institutional 
competencies available, and the relative law framework has been set up. 
Ríos and Quiroz (1995) also argue that the model has worked relatively well in Chile, 
especially where water is scarce and infrastructure more flexible. However, the authors stress 
the existence of regulatory, physical and environmental constrains that limit further 
development of private markets. 
                                                 
2 The owner of a water-use right can freely use the resource, provided that he complies with existing laws. From 
an economic point of view, the main characteristics of water rights are: (i) they are ‘real’ rights, (ii) they are 
divisible; (iii) they can be mortgaged; (iv) their ownership does not imply obligation or priority in use. 
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More recently Bauer (1997) contends that the model has worked more as an incentive 
towards investments than as an effective transaction institution. This is due to some 
inconsistencies in the water code that limited transactions, especially between different 
sectors. According to the author, the main advantage of the market is higher flexibility in 
water ownership, use and management (for instance, through water users organisations). 
Peña and Retamal (1992) have a different opinion, emphasizing the lack of perfect 
competition conditions in Chilean water market, due to spatial and time imperfections, like 
market power, constrains on resource mobility, asymmetric information, etc. 
According to Barrientos (1995), the low number of transactions proves the absence of 
perfect competition. Bauer (1997) reports that local technicians and experts maintain the same 
argument. However, Ríos and Quiroz (1995) argue that it is incorrect to assess the existence 
of competition taking into consideration only the number of transactions, since competition is 
influenced, among other factors, by the distribution of original water rights: a low number of 
transactions represents only a rough proxy of competition in a very heterogeneous context and 
does not clearly reflect the variability of different situations characterised by the areas with a 
very dynamic market and the areas where the market does not work. 
In conclusion, most authors agree that the advantages of the water market exceed its 
disadvantages. In particular, Hearne and Easter (1997), in a case study carried out in the same 
area of the present research, conclude that at least in the Limarí valley3 water rights 
transactions have led to consistent gains from trade, averaging 3.4 times the value of each 
water share coming from the Cogotí reservoir. 
2.2. Distributive impacts 
In principle, if conditions of perfect information, free access and good technical 
assistance exist, farmers should not have problems in entering the water market. However, 
many authors (Barrientos, 1995; Ríos and Quiroz, 1995; Bauer, 1997) reported a loss of water 
rights by many farmers due to their poor knowledge of the new regulations and/or lack of 
financial resources required to enter the process of water rights claim. This is why the 
Direccíon General des Aguas is trying to target its current share on the most vulnerable 
groups. 
According to Gazmuri (1994) and Thobani (1995) the water market should alleviate 
poverty through trickle-down effects: the market provides incentives for the use of water in 
more efficient activities, which in turn lead to higher employment rates and incomes that 
improve quality of life. On the other hand, Gazmuri (1994) stresses that in the past the 
building of under-utilised infrastructures, the distortion of water prices, and the public 
mismanagement of water resources had been financed through taxation, often draining 
resources from the poorer sectors to the wealthier ones: the water market should therefore 
save resources which may be utilised by the government for income redistribution. 
Ríos and Quiroz (1995) and Bauer (1997) do not share the same optimistic view: 
according to these authors the water market in Chile has mainly caused negative distributive 
impacts, especially in rural areas. Farmers have indeed had only marginal access to the 
potential benefits of the model, usually entering the market as sellers, with a weak bargaining 
                                                 
3 However, it should be stressed that the Limarí valley is characterised by peculiar conditions, e.g. relatively low 
transaction costs (approximately 0.02% of the value of the transaction for buyers and 0.05% for sellers) and good 
infrastructures that favour water rights transactions (such as the presence of the Cogotí reservoir, water intakes 
provided by flow gauges and well organised water users organisations). 
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power. Hearne and Easter (1995) also show a certain degree of concern for the distributive 
effects of the water markets. Referring to the Limarí valley, they state that their research 
 
‘has demonstrated that the market transfer of water-use rights does produce substantial economic 
gain-from-trade. These economic gains occur in intersectoral trades and in trade between farmers, and 
they produce rents for both buyers and sellers. Yet buyers, especially large table-grape producers (…), 
receive higher rents than sellers’ (Hearne and Easter, 1995: 38) 
 
In summary, several authors claim that the water market reform in Chile has had 
negative distributive impacts, namely those on the poorer and more dependent on water 
resources for their subsistence, such as peasants. This result is not accidental and it fits into 
the wider Chilean growth model characterized by a dramatic widening of the gap between the 
poor and the rich in the last 20 years4. Therefore some authors have defined such process as 
‘exclusionary growth’ (Carter and Barham, 1996). 
This is where this research starts from: we want to analyse whether the water market 
reform has had any distributive impact and to identify the determinants that affect peasants’ 
participation in the market itself. The study area is the valley of the Limarí river (IV Region), 
in the northern part of the country. It was chosen because: 
• it has been already studied (Hearne and Easter, 1995 and 1997) under the 
perspective of the efficiency effects of the water market and such studies 
reported the existence of a very active water market; 
• agriculture in the region is highly representative of the national context 
(Agraria, 1996). 
3. DISTRIBUTIVE IMPACTS OF THE WATER MARKET 
The distributive impacts of the water market have been studied through the analysis of 
all registrations5 (original registrations and transfers) of rights among agents, at an intra-
sectoral and inter-sectoral level, which took place between 1981 and 1997 in Limarí Province. 
                                                 
4 Londono and Szekely (1997) argue  that income distribution in Chile has consistently worsened from 1971 to 
1989 (Gini’s coefficient increased from 0.47 in 1971, to 0.53 in 1980, and 0.59 in 1989 and has then slightly 
decreased at the beginning of the 1990s, reaching 0.57 in 1994). On the other hand, Ferreira and Litchfield 
(1999: 529), though admitting that ‘Chile’s inequality is high compared to international standards and has 
remained unchanged between 1987 and 1994’, point out how ‘inequality scalar measures – such as Gini’s 
coefficient and Theil’s index – remained practically unchanged during the examined period and there is no 
statistical evidence of dominance according to Lorenz, in the years considered in the sample’. In spite of the lack 
of scientific evidence, the Episcopal Conference reports evidence on the increase of inequality in Chile through a 
document of 1996 entitled ‘¿Es Chile un país equitativo?’. The document asserts that ‘The present income 
distribution in our country should be a reason of shame for Christians (…) The distance between rich and poor 
has grown dramatically in Chile. An aware nation cannot accept this situation. Nor a modern country can tolerate 
these differences’ (Comisión Nacional de Justicia y Paz, 1996: 24). 
5 The registration of water-use rights at the Conservador de Bienes Raices in Ovalle (CBR) is required by the 
law in order to prove the ownership of a right. Water rights ownership can be obtained through: 
• the claim of ‘original rights’ by an entitled person to the Dirección General de Aguas (DGA) who, through 
an administrative act, makes the decision if the applicant has the right to the quantity of water he applied for; 
• market transactions, that is transactions of rights among private agents through purchasing and selling;  
• non-market transfers, that is transfers among private agents other than market transactions, like inheritance 
transfers, donations, etc. 
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3.1. Registrations6 
The data show clearly that the water market is a very active institution in Limarí 
Province (Table 1): the number of registrations, excluding years when unusual factors have 
caused “abnormal” figures7, shows an annual increment to the total (on average, almost 40 
more registrations each year), of which over 84% consists of market transactions and the 
remaining are registrations not transacted in the water market (like original right claims, 
inheritances, donations) (Table 2). 
Table 1. Registrations of water-use rights in the CBR of Ovalle, 1981-1997 
 Agricultural sector registrations 
Years 
Total registrations 
(TR) 
Non-agricultural 
sector registrations Totals Capitalist agriculture Peasant agriculture 
 n. % n. % in TR n. % in TR n. % in TR n. % in TR 
1981 506 37.02 76 25.85 430 40.07 109 24.12 321 51.69 
1982 37 2.71 11 3.74 26 2.42 18 3.98 8 1.29 
1983 21 1.54 15 5.10 6 0.56 3 0.66 3 0.48 
1984 24 1.76 5 1.70 19 1.77 13 2.88 6 0.97 
1985 59 4.32 21 7.14 38 3.54 15 3.32 23 3.70 
1986 57 4.17 8 2.72 49 4.57 33 7.30 16 2.58 
1987 48 3.51 25 8.50 23 2.14 14 3.10 9 1.45 
1988 224 16.39 19 6.46 205 19.11 35 7.74 170 27.38 
1989 37 2.71 18 6.12 19 1.77 9 1.99 10 1.61 
1990 31 2.27 7 2.38 24 2.24 16 3.54 8 1.29 
1991 28 2.05 4 1.36 24 2.24 18 3.98 6 0.97 
1992 48 3.51 16 5.44 32 2.98 29 6.42 3 0.48 
1993 87 6.36 17 5.78 70 6.52 65 14.38 5 0.81 
1994 51 3.73 8 2.72 43 4.01 22 4.87 21 3.38 
1995 37 2.71 11 3.74 26 2.42 21 4.65 5 0.81 
1996 34 2.49 14 4.76 20 1.86 13 2.88 7 1.13 
1997 38 2.78 19 6.46 19 1.77 19 4.20 0 0.00 
Total 1,367 100.00 294 100.00 1,073 100.00 452 100.00 621 100.00 
µ 80.41 100.00 17.29 21.51 63.12 78.49 26.59 33.07 36.53 45.43 
µ* 39.29 100.00 13.00 33.09 26.29 66.91 17.36 44.18 8.93 22.73 
µ = average; µ* = average excluding 1981, 1988 and 1993.  
Source: elaboration of original data, CBR of Ovalle. 
The data show that peasant agriculture8, capitalist agriculture and non-agricultural 
sectors differ markedly in terms of their own economic behaviour (Table 2). It seems there is 
a gradient moving from non-agricultural sectors at one end to peasant agriculture at the other 
end, passing through capitalist agriculture which lies in an intermediate position. Non-
agricultural sectors are characterised by a strong (and ever increasing) involvement in market 
transactions vs. peasant agriculture. For example, non-agricultural sector agents have access 
to water rights mainly through markets transactions (86.05% of total non-agricultural 
                                                 
6 Whatever the way of accessing a water right, the validation of legal ownership requires its registration in the 
CBR: under the term ‘registrations’ all items listed in the previous footnote, i.e. original registrations, markets 
transactions and non-market transfers are therefore considered. 
7 In particular, some years show values well above the average trend due to ‘abnormal’ factors. 1981, the year 
the new model was introduced, accounted for the highest number of demands for original rights. 1988, the year 
in which the election campaign for the constitutional plebiscite took place, and 1993, when the presidential 
elections took place, have both been years in which the ‘political cycle effect’ was evident, since Pinochet’s 
government tried to buy off votes of certain political sectors (namely peasants) through the assignation of 
original rights. This is why in Table 1 the values of averages excluding such years are also included. 
8 The Chilean agricultural census defines peasant agriculture (agricultura campesina) as any farm that receives 
more than 50% of its revenue from agricultural activities which are carried out in farms not exceeding 12 
hectares with ‘basic irrigation’ (this represents the ‘standard’ adopted under the agrarian reform that corresponds 
to the yield of one hectare of land under low intensity irrigation, within the basin of the Maipo river), and whose 
production is worth less than 54,250 million pesos (in 1997). Any other farm is considered as a capitalist farm. 
We will adopt the same distinction in this paper. 
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registrations, Table 2) while peasants mainly through the claim of original rights (81.63% of 
total peasant agriculture registrations, Table 2). Moreover, re-sales9 of a given water right 
amount to 60.84% of total sectoral rights in the case of non-agricultural sectors vs. only 
13.16% of total peasant agriculture rights. 
Non-agricultural agents act mainly as buyers (28.57% of water rights total purchases vs. 
only 4.43 of total sales, Table 3) whilst peasants as sellers (16.78% of water rights total 
purchases vs. 62.82 of total sales, Table 3). Non-agricultural sectors show a certain degree of 
market power. This statement is supported, only indirectly, by different indicators10: (i) the 
ratio between purchasing prices and selling prices, averaging 0.91 in the non-agricultural 
sectors and 1.04 in the peasant agriculture sector; (ii) the water rights concentration index, 
equal to 1.60 registrations/individual in non-agricultural sectors and 1.15 among peasants; and 
(iii) the average number of water shares11 per registration, around 16 shares in non-
agricultural sectors vs. 7.5 in the peasant agriculture sector. 
In conclusion, water market seems to be quite far from a perfectly competitive market. 
Peasant agriculture clearly suffers from the market power of other sectors. Moreover, despite 
owing roughly one third of irrigated land in the Province (Agraria, 1996), peasant agriculture 
is still plagued by problems of legal recognition of water-use rights, poor technological 
infrastructures, poor organisation and difficulties in accessing information12.  
 
Table 2. Characterisation of agents’ behaviour in the water market per sector, 1981-1997 
Characteristic Non-agricultural sectors 
Agriculture total Capitalist agriculture Peasant agriculture 
Type of registration (% on 
total sector registrations) 
Orig. registrations = 13.95 
Market transactions=86.05
Orig. registrations = 56.28 
Market transactions=43.72
Orig. registrations = 21.46 
Market transactions=78.54 
Orig. registrations = 81.63 
Market transactions=18.37
Average registrations size 
(shares/registration) 16.24 12.24 15.55 7.48 
Concentration index  
(registrations/individual) 1.59 1.44 1.60 1.15 
Purchasing/selling ratio:     
   - Registrations 1.94 0.90 1.80 0.48 
   - Prices 0.91 1.07 1.51 1.04 
Re-sales (% on sales) 60.84 32.35 60.17 13.16 
Source: elaboration of original data, CBR of Ovalle. 
 
                                                 
9 Re-sales of the same right represent the most evident feature of an active market. Analysing such a 
phenomenon in the area (and considering only the first five re-sales of a given right) we found that on average a 
right has been re-sold after 3.75 years, with a strong increase in real price: the price ratio was 1.66 between the 
first and second re-sales and 1.74 between the second and third ones. It also should be emphasized that since 
1992 nearly all transfers of water-use rights have not included transfers of land ownership. 
10 Indeed, the reported indicators can only be interpreted as prima facie indicators of market power. The rationale 
behind them is that if market power exists, the economic agent showing this characteristic should be able to 
impose higher prices when he acts as seller and/or lower prices when he acts as a buyer: this is why we 
computed the ratio of purchasing/selling prices per each sector. Moreover, the quantity of the exchanged 
commodity per agent should be on average greater in the case of an agent showing market power: this is why we 
also reported the water rights concentration index (number of registrations per individual) and the average 
number of water shares per registration. 
11 According to the Water Code (Código de Aguas, 1981), a water share corresponds to 1 l/s with 85% of 
irrigation security, varying in conditions of water scarcity. A water share is the ‘measurement unit’ of water 
rights. 
12 This emerged clearly from the comments made by many agents in the study area. See also section 4 for a 
quantitative assessment of the role of these variables in determining water market behaviour by economic agents. 
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Table 3. Intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral water rights transfers (% of the total), 1981-1997 
Purchases 
Sales Total Non- agricultural 
sectors 
Agriculture 
total  
Capitalist 
agriculture 
Peasant 
agriculture 
Capitalist agriculture 32.73 1.24 31.48 27.32 4.16 
Peasant agriculture  62.82 25.93 36.89 25.52 11.37 
Total agriculture 95.56 27.18 68.37 52.84 15.53 
Non-agricultural sector 4.43 1.38 3.05 1.80 1.24 
Total 100.00 28.57 71.42 54.64 16.78 
Source: elaboration of original data, CBR of Ovalle. 
3.2. Distributive effects on the whole population 
The distribution of water rights (in terms of water shares) among the various groups has 
been very unbalanced since the inception of the reform: in 1981 the two higher quintiles (Q4-
Q5) accounted for more than 80% of total the water rights (Table 4) and the Gini’s 
coefficient13 was 0.54. As time went on, the water rights distribution worsened: indeed, the 
three lowest quintiles showed a decrease in the number of water shares, while the quintile that 
originally held the largest percentage in water share holding increased its percentage, forming 
a consistent increase of the Gini’s coefficient - which in 1997 was 0.57. On the whole there 
has been a general decrease of the per capita water volume, in all segments of population, 
which was caused by an increase in the number of users14. The quintiles Q1-Q3 are the most 
affected by these dynamics. In fact they have lost between one-fifth and one-third of the 
average volume held in 1981, while the two higher quintiles have lost only around one-tenth 
of the initial volume (Table 4). 
Table 4. Distribution of per capita water rights (number of water shares), 1981-1997 
1981 1987 1992 1997 
Quintiles 
P.c. shares % in total P.c. shares % in total P.c. shares % in total P.c. shares % in total 
% change 
1981-1997 
Difference in 
% change 
1° 0.93 1.18 0.91 1.18 0.74 1.06 0.73 1.11 -21.62 -0.07 
2° 3.52 4.49 3.29 4.30 2.65 3.79 2.33 0.01 -33.74 -4.48 
3° 9.43 12.04 9.28 12.13 7.20 10.31 5.96 9.11 -36.83 -2.93 
4° 16.91 21.58 16.90 22.08 16.31 23.36 15.27 23.35 -9.70 1.76 
5° 47.57 60.70 46.16 60.31 42.93 61.48 41.12 62.86 -13.55 2.16 
Total 15.67 100.00 15.27 100.00 13.97 100.00 13.06 100.00 -16.63 - 
Gini coeff. 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.57   
Source: elaboration of original data, CBR of Ovalle. 
It should be stressed that the impact of the decreases on the three lower quintiles is 
important not only in terms of the relative amount (i.e. percentage) of such decreases, but also 
because of the low absolute figures on which they occur (between 0 and 10 water shares per 
capita), thus undermining future farming activities15, while the decreases in the higher 
quintiles take place on larger volumes (between 10 and 216 water shares per capita). 
                                                 
13 The Gini coefficient was computed taking into account the owners of water rights as relevant population. 
14 The increase in the number of users is due to population growth, especially in urban areas, and the diffusion of 
fruit and vegetable crops in irrigated areas: the total number of users has grown from 141,000 in 1981 to 179,000 
in 1997. 
15 Indeed, in the Limarí valley the control of water is a strategic determinant of agricultural development (Hearne 
and Easter, 1995; Agraria, 1996) and therefore of income attainments. 
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3.3. Distributive effects on peasant agriculture 
Also in the case of peasant agriculture there is a clear worsening of water resources 
distribution during the examined period: the Gini coefficient increased consistently from 0.50 
in 1981 to 0.58 in 1997 (Table 5). 
Peasant agriculture shows a general and consistent loss of water resources (-83.37% in 
terms of per capita water shares, with the number of users decreasing from 10,360 in 1981 to 
4,800 in 1997); only the highest quintile has been able to limit its loss16 (-4.91%), while lower 
quintiles show remarkable losses (in particular Q2 and Q3), especially considering the modest 
volumes they owned in 1981 (Table 5). 
Table 5. Per capita distribution of water rights among peasants (number of water shares), 1981-1997 
1981 1987 1992 1997 
Quintiles 
P.c. shares % in total P.c. shares % in total P.c. shares % in total P.c. shares % in total 
% change 
1981-1997 
Difference in 
% change 
1° 0.81 1.38 0.76 1.36 0.55 1.08 0.52 1.06 -35.85 -0.32 
2° 2.70 4.58 2.25 4.03 1.40 2.75 1.26 2.57 -53.31 -2.01 
3° 8.34 14.19 7.15 12.82 4.93 9.69 4.32 8.84 -48.16 -5.34 
4° 15.50 26.36 15.70 28.16 13.76 27.04 12.88 26.34 -16.88 -0.01 
5° 31.46 53.50 29.88 53.62 30.26 59.44 29.92 61.18 -4.91 7.68 
Total 58.81 100.00 55.74 100.00 10.18 100.00 9.78 100.00 -83.37 - 
Gini coeff. 0.50 0.51 0.56 0.58   
Source: elaboration of original data, CBR of Ovalle. 
We are not able to say if the revenue from water sales by peasant households have had a 
positive effect on peasants livelihood17. We only have indirect information that show that the 
worsening of water resources distribution among peasants has been paralleled by the 
worsening of peasants’ income distribution (Table 6): indeed, the poor18 have increased by 
150%, due to the increase of poor in Q1 (from 38% to 66%) and owing to the fall to below the 
poverty line of peasants in Q2 (nearly 30%). Though it is not possible to define a causal 
relationship between the loss of water-use rights and poverty (or vice versa), there is an 
evidently strong correlation between the two phenomena. 
On the other hand this represents an empirical evidence that the market, when left to 
itself, though able to increase the general efficiency of the system, is not able to ensure an 
equitable distribution of resources and income (López, 1995; Londono and Szekely, 1997). In 
the specific case, it should be emphasized that the harsh liberalistic economic policy, 
promoted by the military government towards the peasants (aimed at leaving the market to 
select elite groups who are able to link themselves to the globalisation processes of the 
agricultural sector, and to free resources and channel them towards more efficient uses), has 
enabled the most socially and economically influential ones to exploit the opportunities 
offered by the market reform and gain most of its benefits. 
                                                 
16 Indeed it increased its percentage in water share holding (7.68% over the whole period).   
17 For instance, giving them the opportunity for diversifying their own income sources and/or increasing other 
household income assets. 
18 From the point of view of socio-economic characterisation, all peasants are considered as minifundistas, i.e. 
small farmers who generally represent the most vulnerable groups of the rural sector (López, 1995). Among 
peasants we can classify as poor the so-called sitieros, i.e. former beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, whose 
plots do not exceed 1,500 m². The remaining peasants, known as parceleros, are not considered as poor: they are 
peasants whose farm does not exceed 12 hectares of ‘basic irrigation’. 
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Table 6. Evolution of poverty among peasants (percentages), 1981-1997 
1981 1987 1992 1997 
Quintiles 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
1° 38.10 61.90 40.37 59.63 54.86 45.14 66.48 33.52 
2° 0.00 100.00 10.00 90.00 25.00 75.00 29.36 70.64 
3° 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
4° 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
5° 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 10.22 89.78 13.33 86.67 20.26 79.74 25.21 74.79 
Source: elaboration of original data and INDAP, 1996. 
4.  DETERMINANTS AFFECTING PEASANTS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE WATER 
MARKET 
The economic, social and institutional factors, which affect peasants’ behaviour towards the 
water market (enter/not enter, buy/sell), were analysed using a logistic regression analysis. 
The data needed for the analysis were obtained through a survey carried out on 114 
agricultural households19, corresponding to 2.38% of peasants’ irrigated farms in 1996 in 
Limarí Province. 
4.1. Peasants’ involvement in water market 
The determinants affecting peasants’ involvement in the water market have been 
analysed by estimating a logit model, whose dependent variable is the probability of entering 
the water market. The best model is a five-independent-variable model (Table 7), which has 
very high values of overall significance (χ²=36.54 that for 5 degrees of freedom means a 
probability level higher than 99%) and statistically significant estimates of the coefficients (all 
asymptotic ts have a probability level greater than 95%). 
The coefficients have all the expected signs. The variables MEDNI, OTRO and INF 
have negative coefficients, that means that the higher the educational attainment of the 
household, the participation in agricultural organisations and the level of information about 
the water market, the higher the probability of entering the water market. On the other hand, 
the variables JFED and PAS have a positive coefficient, i.e. the older the household head and 
the higher the values of the grazing areas, the higher the probability of not entering the water 
market. 
                                                 
19 The sample was designed by using the information on the variability of farms’ structural characteristics 
provided by the 1996 General Agricultural Census (INE, 1998). Therefore a random stratified sample was 
adopted. 
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Table 7. Logit model estimates for peasants’ involvement in the water market 
transactions 
Dependent variable y=1 do not transact y=0 transact 
Degrees of freedom 5 
-2logl restricted 144.406 
-2logl non-restricted 107.865 
2χ  36.541 
Percentage of correct forecasts 82.8% 
Variables Coefficients 2Pr χ>  
Intercept 1.2146 0.0482 
JFED: Age of household head 0.1989 0.0153 
MEDNI: Household education attainment  -0.3258 0.0013 
OTRO: Being member of agricultural organisations other 
than water users  -3.3168 0.0005 
PAS: Farm grazing area 0.9293 0.0154 
INF: Level of information about local water market -3.3251 0.0290 
4.2. Peasants’ behaviour 
The analysis of peasants’ behaviour in the water market has also been carried out 
through the estimate of a logit model: the probability of selling a water right is determined by 
six variables, that are partly the same variables affecting the participation in the market (Table 
8). The estimated model is statistically highly significant both in terms of its overall 
significance (χ²=28.683 with 6 degrees of freedom, that is more than 99% of probability) and 
in terms of parameters estimates (all t statistics exceed 95% of probability). 
The variables MEDNI, CRE, DIR, INF and ACC have negative signs, that means that 
the higher the household education attainments, the size of agricultural credit obtained, the 
participation as managers in water users associations, the owned volume of water, and the 
level of information about local water markets, the higher the probability of buying (and the 
lower the probability of selling) water use rights. Again, as the head of the household gets 
older, the probability of selling water use right becomes higher. 
Table 8. Logit model estimates for peasants’ behaviour in the water market 
Dependent variable y=1 sell y=0 buy 
Degrees of freedom 6 
-2logl restricted 73.325 
-2logl non-restricted 58.682 
2χ  28.683 
Percentage of correct forecasts 87.6% 
Variables Coefficients 2Pr χ>  
Intercept 0.1895 0.0918 
JFED: Age of household head 0.0759 0.0321 
MEDNI: Household education attainment  -0.0857 0.0119 
CRE: Credit  -1.9503 0.0225 
DIR: Being manager of water users associations -1.3870 0.0293 
ACC: Total number of water shares -0.1358 0.0291 
INF: Level of information about local water market -7.5430 0.0009 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
A first conclusion of the present research is that water market has become a very active 
institution in the Limarí valley. However this does not mean that it is a competitive market; 
on the contrary, there are evidences that the market is highly imperfect, mainly because of 
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asymmetric information and of barriers to entry - as proven by the econometric estimates 
reported in tables 7 and 8 - due to social, cultural, economic, and institutional conditions 
existing among different agents. 
The distribution of water resources is heavily unbalanced and it tended to worsen in the 
period of analysis. This is a long lasting phenomenon that dates back to years before the 
market reform (Londono and Szekely, 1997), but it worsened markedly between 1981 and 
1997, because of the negative impact of the new institutional model. Such a period is 
characterised by two general trends: (i) a general decrease in the amount of per capita rights 
and (ii) the accumulation of resources by the most powerful social-economic groups. 
If we contrast these trends with the socio-economic structure of the population, it 
becomes evident that peasants are the group that suffered the greatest loss. In the Limarí 
valley the control of water is a strategic determinant of agricultural development (Hearne and 
Easter, 1995; Agraria, 1996) and therefore of income attainments. This raises strong concerns 
because of the high level of poverty in the rural areas of the Province (World Bank, 1994; 
López, 1995). The consequence of the above mentioned trends are that the worsening of water 
resources distribution took place in a broader ‘immiserising’ context for a non-trivial part of 
peasant households. 
Concerning the determinants affecting peasants’ participation in the water market, it is 
interesting, from an institutional point of view, to consider the effect of the variables relative 
to information, education and participation in agricultural organisations and in water users 
associations. In short, the econometric analysis proves that the probability to transact in the 
water market decreases with the increase of poverty – meant primarily as lack of education 
and access to information rather than scarcity of resources and income. This emphasizes the 
potential role of government interventions in the training of human resources20 and the 
promotion of adequate and accessible information for the whole population, in order to 
eliminate socio-cultural barriers and ensure equal opportunities to all agents. 
Peasants’ market behaviour (buy/sell) is largely determined by the same factors affecting 
the entry in the market. If we link this result with the increasing competitive pressure on 
peasants’ resources and with the peasants’ weak market power, we can conclude that the 
market behaviour is not a pondered decision concerning entering/not entering the market 
competition, but rather the consequence of a set of socio-cultural and institutional failures, 
which eventually forces peasants to sell. 
The core of the discussion on the distributive effects of water market is not to be in 
favour or against the water market per se, but rather it concerns the absolute Government’s 
abdication from its role as “referee” of the game, which is a consequence of the radically 
liberalistic cultural environment where the reform was designed and implemented, that 
prevented any form of public intervention, both in correcting market failures (informative 
asymmetries, just to mention the most evident in the Limarí valley), and in redistributing 
resources in favour of the most vulnerable groups of society.  
In conclusion, we must say that, even in the case of the water market, the strategic 
objective of ‘growth with equity’ formally pursued by the Concertaciòn democratic 
Governments ever since 1990, has not been achieved, since water resources distribution kept 
on its negative trend during the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
20 López (1995), studying the causes of poverty and of income differentials in Chile, tests various hypotheses 
(quality of human capital, technological level, market imperfections, infrastructural deficiencies) and proves that 
the low quality of human capital is the main determinant of poverty. 
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